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 Abstract:  Using a two-stage estimation procedure, we examine the determinants of 
foreign investors’ participation in the privatization process of developing countries, 
with a particular emphasis on the role of the institutional environment. First, we 
estimate the probability that foreign investors target privatized firms in a given 
country. We show that an investor-friendly institutional environment which protects 
shareholders’ rights favors foreign investors’ participation. Foreigners also prefer 
large firms from high growth economies and socially stable countries with low political 
risk. Second, we restrict our analysis to those firms that foreign investors actually 
choose. We show that the use of private sales is a key determinant of foreign 
investors’ stake in a privatized firm. 
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FOREIGN INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATIZATIONS: 
DOES THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT MATTER? 
  
I. Introduction 
  Foreign investors are a major stakeholder in the privatization process in developing 
countries. In this context, foreign investment is generally viewed as a valuable way to bring new 
capital for the often much needed restructuring of newly privatized firms, and to contribute to 
the transfer of technology and managerial expertise to the host country. Foreign investors also 
help to improve the corporate governance of newly privatized firms by requiring high 
information disclosure standards and, for reputation concerns, by maintaining a strict control of 
managers’ actions (Dyck 2001; Shirley 2002). 
Whether the sales method of state-owned enterprises is a direct sale or a public offering, 
foreign participation is omnipresent. For example, foreign participation as a share of total 
divestitures in the developing world increased steadily in the 1990s, reaching close to 76 
percent of total privatization proceeds in 1999 and generating an estimated $32.3 billion in 
foreign exchange (World Bank 2001). In 1999, foreign direct investment was the main source of 
foreign revenues raised through privatization activity, accounting for 86 percent of the total, 
while foreign portfolio investment accounted for the remaining 14 percent. However, it also 
appears that the extent of foreign participation in privatization varies greatly across regions. For 
example, over the 1990-1999 period, foreign investors contributed to 71 and 15 percent of total 
privatization proceeds for (1) Latin America and the Caribbean and (2) Middle East and North 
Africa, respectively.   
The objective of this paper is to examine what drives foreign investors in the privatization 
process in developing countries and to determine the extent of ownership they hold thereafter. 
We especially seek to determine whether the cross-country differences in the institutional 
environment help to explain the cross-country variation in foreign participation. In other words,   2
we examine whether foreign participation depends, among other things, on the extent of 
investor protection and law enforcement, in addition to the privatization process characteristics 
that signal the extent of government commitment to its policy reforms. A great variety in the 
(often weak) legal and institutional environments of developing countries (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997; Denis and McConnell 2003) makes the analysis of this issue in this specific context 
interesting.  
We relate and contribute to the literature on privatization and corporate governance in 
two ways: First, privatization constitutes a dramatic change of ownership from public to private, 
providing us with a unique opportunity to determine what attracts foreign investors to a country 
and what explains their choice of ownership structure in a firm.  Second, we consider firm-
specific attributes and characteristics of the privatization process in addition to country-specific 
determinants. By considering the role of both firm and country characteristics in the foreign 
ownership decision, we extend the single country studies that examine the firm characteristics 
most valued by foreign investors (e.g., Kang and Stulz 1997; Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001; 
Anderson, Jandik and Makhija 2001). Additionally, by focusing on the role of the legal and 
institutional environment, we contribute to the line of research initiated by La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, who showed in a series of papers that the difference in legal 
systems across countries explains, to a large extent, the cross-country differences in ownership 
structure, capital structure, economic growth and corporate policies (La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997 1998 2000; La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999).  To 
explore these issues, we use a rich dataset that includes 220 newly privatized firms from various 
industries and that operate in as many as 28 countries, institutionally and geographically 
diverse. 
Since we analyze both the decision to invest by foreign investors and the extent of their 
participation in the firm, the appropriate framework in this case is a two-stage estimation   3
procedure. This allows us to account for any possibility of sample selection bias (Heckman, 
1979). Indeed, it is often argued in the privatization context that certain types of owners, 
particularly foreign investors, may be able to identify better-quality firms from institutionally 
better countries (Megginson and Netter 2001). Accordingly, we estimate, in the first stage, the 
probability that foreigners invest in a newly privatized firm. In the second stage, we look into the 
determinants of the extent of foreign participation in a newly privatized firm (given that it is 
positive). Our results from the first-stage estimation indicate that an investor-friendly institutional 
environment, where minority investors’ rights are protected and laws are enforced, positively 
influence foreign investors’ participation in privatization. For example, law and order is positively 
and significantly related to the foreign investment decision. So is the degree of social stability in 
the country, proxied by the internal conflict index. Furthermore, foreign investors are more likely 
to invest in privatized firms at the latest stages of the process in line with Perotti’s (1995) 
confidence building hypothesis.  Finally, foreign investors are more likely to participate in larger 
privatized firms and high growth economies.  
   In the second-stage estimation, we find that, in addition to the quality of the institutional 
environment, the extent of foreign ownership is larger in firms privatized through private sales.   
Overall, our results highlight the importance of reforming the institutional environment in 
the countries that are anxious to increase foreign direct involvement in the privatization process.   
II. Privatization, Institutions and Foreign Ownership 
Privatization typically leads to a drastic change in the ownership structure of state-
owned enterprises. The government divestiture allows participation by new stakeholders that 
generally include foreign investors. By seeking foreign investors’ participation, the government 
w a n t s  t o  i m p o r t  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a n d  m a n a g e r i a l  k n o w - h o w  a s  w e l l  a s  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e s  o f  
financing which are necessary to fund the restructuring of newly privatized firms. However, a   4
variety of reasons, including the inefficient legal systems and the political uncertainty related to 
privatization can deter foreign investors from investing in developing countries (DCs).  
In this paper, we refer to the country-specific socio-economic and legal environments as 
the institutional framework.  Economic growth and investment are more likely to occur within a 
favorable institutional environment (World Bank 2002). In such a framework, the legal system 
efficiently protects shareholders’ rights.  La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
(LLSV hereafter) show that commercial and corporate laws vary across countries, primarily 
because of differences in legal origins, and conclude that common law countries provide a 
stronger investor protection than civil law countries. Therefore, an efficient institutional 
framework that protects and enforces the rights of investors is more likely to attract foreign 
investors than otherwise. A recent study by Globerman and Shapiro (2003) confirms this 
assertion and shows that governance infrastructure (including the legal system) is a significant 
determinant of the decision of US investors to target a country.1 
Along this evidence, several studies have recognized the impact of cross-country 
institutional differences on foreign direct investment flows. In the specific case of privatization, 
we conjecture that the institutional framework is particularly important for the following reasons: 
First, in the case of privatized firms, the institutional environment has been shown to be a 
significant determinant of performance improvements and efficiency gains in state-owned 
enterprises after divestiture (e.g., Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami 2001). Thus, through their role 
in establishing expectations about the rights to use resources and repatriate gains (Chhibber 
and Majumdar 1999), institutions become particularly important to foreign investors involved in 
privatization. Second, the legal system affects both the ownership structure and the ex-ante 
decision to participate.  For example, LLSV (1998) show that corporate ownership structure 
                                                 
1 The authors include in the governance infrastructure public institutions and policies created by 
governments as a framework for economic, legal and social relations.   5
tends to be more concentrated in civil law countries to substitute for the poor prevailing investor 
protection and to ensure effective monitoring. For instance, Djankov and Hoekman (1999) show 
that, under the Czech’s law that provides little protection to minority shareholders, equity 
investors have an incentive to take a majority stake. Hence, to substitute for the weak legal 
system, most firms with foreign ownership are majority foreign-owned.  
The institutional framework is also likely to have an impact on foreign ownership through 
corruption. Wei (2000), for example, finds that a rise in corruption significantly reduces bilateral 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from twelve source countries to forty-five host countries. A 
recent study by Habib and Zurawicki (2002) also confirms that corruption is negatively related to 
aggregate bilateral FDI flows between 1996 and 1998 for eighty-nine countries.  
Finally, political risk is an other component of the institutional framework that is likely to 
influence foreign investors’ participation in privatizations. To foreign investors, political 
uncertainty and restrictions on gains’ repatriation, are a major concern. (Heinisz 2002). This 
situation is further exacerbated by the uncertainty that is related to the privatization process 
itself. For instance, most privatized firms in DCs involve a stake retained by the government. The 
government residual participation may provide it with the opportunity to intervene in the firms 
operations either directly through its retained shares or indirectly through regulation.  
In addition to the institutional framework, the privatization process characteristics might 
play a role in the investment decision of foreign investors: for example, the method of sale 
might have a direct impact on the extent of ownership that foreign investors will ultimately hold. 
Compared to privatizations through public offerings, private sales are more likely to yield a 
larger participation by foreign investors. Another characteristic of the privatization process that 
could be potentially important is the timing of sale. According to Perotti (1995), governments try 
to build confidence among investors and signal their commitment through the terms of sale   6
(pricing and residual ownership). If policy uncertainty is resolved over time, one should observe, 
other things being equal, more foreign investment recently.  
The above discussion suggests that the decision of foreign investors to buy newly 
privatized firms and the extent of their participation in the ownership structure of the firms will 
most likely depend on the prevailing institutional framework and the privatization process 
characteristics in a given country. To examine this issue, we adopt a unified approach and use 
both target firm- and country-specific variables in order to identify the determinants of foreign 
participation in privatization across countries and the extent of ownership across firms. The 
advantage of conducting a cross-country study instead of focusing on one country is to be 
able to control for institutional differences among countries.  It also allows us to capture the 
regional, institutional and macro-economic considerations that are inherent to the investment 
decision in DCs.  
III. Data Description 
 The Sample 
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the sample which includes 220 newly privatized 
firms from 28 countries, diversified across three main geographical regions: 30% of the firms 
come from North Africa and the Middle East, 19.50% come from East and South Asia and the 
Pacific, and 29% come from Latin America and the Caribbean. Sub-Saharan African firms 
account for 14% of the sample. 
According to the World Bank classification, most of the privatizations in our sample 
occurred in low income countries (39%), followed by upper middle income countries (32%) and 
lower middle income countries (30%). The privatizations in the sample are distributed across a 
wide range of industries: mainly, financials (24%), industrials (13%), materials (15%) and utilities 
(close to 11%). Table 1 also shows that privatizations are more clustered during the nineties   7
which indicate more intensive privatization efforts undertaken in DCs during the last decade as 
reported by the World Bank (2001). 
As described earlier, our first objective is to explain the likelihood that a foreigner invests 
in a privatized firm from a DC. Our second objective is to investigate the determinants of the 
extent of foreign ownership in newly privatized firms. Out of the initial sample of 220 firms, 20 
firms have no data on the extent of foreign ownership, which results in a total sample of 200 
firms where foreign ownership is higher than or equal to zero. We observe a strictly positive 
foreign ownership stake in 108 firms. 
< Insert Table 1 around here > 
According to Table 2, the mean percentage held by foreign investors at the time of 
privatization is 19% ranging from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 100%. The government’s 
stake is 37% on average. For the sub-sample of 108 firms with positive foreign ownership, the 
mean stake held by foreign investors is 35.50%, while the government’s ownership gravitates 
around 40%. 
< Insert Table 2 around here> 
Variables 
Table 3 provides the definition and the data source of the variables used to investigate 
the determinants of foreign investors’ participation in privatizations. We consider three broad 
categories of variables. The first category gathers institutional variables such as law and order, 
corruption, social inequality indicators, internal conflicts, political risk as well as a measure of 
stock market development. The second category encompasses variables related to the 
privatization process such as the method of sales, the timing of privatization and the possible 
relinquishment of control by the government following divestiture. The third category includes 
firm- and country-specific control variables such as the profitability, the size and the industry of   8
the newly privatized firms as well as the real GDP growth, the size of the host country and 
restrictions on foreign ownership. 
< Insert Table 3 around here> 
 Institutional Variables. To proxy for the institutional environment, we use the following measures: 
First, we hypothesize that legal protection and law enforcement, proxied by the law and order 
index (LAW), should positively influence the decision and the extent of ownership by foreign 
investors, because they are directly related to the risk of expropriation of their wealth. We also 
conjecture that corruption (COR) is a barrier to investment as it increases the transaction costs 
to the foreign investors and hence may deter them from investing in the country. Therefore, we 
expect a negative relationship between corruption and the investment decision and the extent 
of ownership (Drabek and Payne 1999; Smartzyska and Wei 2001; Habib and Zurawicki 2002).  
The literature on FDI generally agrees that political risk is a major determinant of the 
investment decision (Heinisz 2002). Therefore, we include the political risk index (POLRISK) 
constructed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). We conjecture that the likelihood of 
foreign investment increases when political risk is lower, that is, when governments are more 
stable and the risk of nationalization is lower. Further, we account for the underlying socio-
economic conditions by including internal conflicts (IC) as a proxy for social stability in the 
country, and the GINI coefficient as a proxy for social inequality. We expect favorable social 
and institutional conditions to positively affect the decision of foreign investors to enter the 
country, and the extent of their stake in the privatized firm. 
Finally, we control for the degree of development of the stock market by considering the 
turnover ratio (TURNOVER). Foreign investors generally seek more liquid markets which provide 
them with the opportunity to liquidate their positions more easily in times of uncertainty.   9
Privatization Process Characteristics. To control for the characteristics of the privatization 
process, we include the following variables. First, we consider a dummy CONTROL that indicates 
whether the government relinquished control in the firm: the government’s partnership may 
represent an implicit guarantee t o  f o r e i g n e r s  t h a t  t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t  w i l l  b e  p r o t e c t e d ,  o r  a  
guarantee of the firm’s quality. Second, the privatization method can also be important in 
determining the foreign ownership in a privatized firm. A private (direct) sale (PS), for example, 
transfers control rights to foreign investors which can lead to higher foreign ownership stakes. 
Finally, we conjecture that foreign investors should be more involved in recent privatizations 
rather than in earlier ones as policy uncertainty about the privatization policy is resolved over 
time (Perotti 1995; Perotti and van Oijen 1999). To proxy for the timing of privatization, we classify 
the newly privatized firms with respect to the median country privatization date and include a 
dummy  LATE that equals 1 if the firm is privatized after the country median date of all 
privatizations, and zero otherwise. 
 Firm- and Country-Specific Control Variables.  Studies that analyze the determinants of foreign 
ownership in a firm generally agree on several firm attributes. For example, Kang and Stulz 
(1997) study the shareholdings of foreigners in individual Japanese firms between 1971 and 
1991, and find that foreigners prefer larger firms. The evidence, more recently confirmed by 
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) for a sample of Swedish firms, is consistent with the conjecture 
that foreigners invest in firms that they are better informed about. This argument is also valid for 
newly privatized firms since larger, more established firms are more likely to appeal to foreign 
investors. Therefore, we control for size by including the logarithm of the size of the privatization 
issue at the time of privatization (LISSUE).  
We also conjecture that foreigners are more likely to choose firms with a relatively good 
performance because they are safer and are less likely to be expropriated in an imperfect legal 
system (LLSV 1997; Anderson, Jandik and Makhija 2001). However, more profitable firms may not   10
need foreign blockholders for extra external monitoring. In light of these two conflicting 
arguments, the sign associated with performance is uncertain.  As a proxy for the pre-
privatization performance, we use the mean return on sales (ROS) over three years before 
privatization.2   
We further include the firm’s leverage as a proxy for long term financial distress, 
measured by total debt to total assets (TDTA).  As in Kang and Stulz (1997), we conjecture that 
foreign investors will not invest in highly indebted firms that are more likely to bankrupt. Finally, 
the industry affiliation is also controlled for through the strategic versus non-strategic industry 
classification. We include a dummy variable (STRATEGIC) that equals one if the firm operates in 
energy, utilities, telecommunications, financials and transportations, and zero otherwise.   
The literature on FDI generally agrees that a variety of domestic economic factors 
defines a country’s ability to draw foreign investment (Bevan and Estrin 2000; Globerman and 
Shapiro 2003). Thus, we use real GDP growth (GDPG) as a proxy for the economic environment. 
We also control for GDP as a proxy for the size of the country and for TURNOVER as a proxy for 
the stock market development. Finally, we include a proxy for the restrictions on foreign 
ownership (FORMAX) that might be binding  foreign investors’ choices.  
  In Table 4, we present the correlation coefficients between the country-specific 
institutional variables and the control variables discussed above. The various institutional 
variables (law and order, corruption, political risk and social instability) are highly correlated with 
each other, with correlation coefficients that range from 0.66 to 0.84. Likewise, it appears that 
the level of market development is positively and significantly associated with the levels of legal 
                                                 
2 In an international context, we prefer to focus on return on sales because this  ratio is less sensitive 
to inflation and accounting standards than return on assets (Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh 
1994). 
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protection, economic development and income inequality. As a consequence of this high 
degree of intercorrelation, these variables will not enter jointly in any equation.  
< Insert Table 4 around here> 
IV. Empirical Results 
We conduct our analysis in two steps: First, we perform a univariate analysis by 
comparing two partitions of the sample firms based on the presence or not of foreign investors. 
Second, we perform a multivariate analysis to investigate the determinants of foreign 
participation and the extent of foreign ownership.  
 A First Look at Foreign Ownership in Newly Privatized Firms 
We first split our sample according to whether foreign investors are involved or not in the 
ownership structure of the privatized firms. We then assess the differences in firms’ 
characteristics and country characteristics between both sub-samples. The rationale of such an 
analysis is to identify those variables that seem important in conditioning the decision of a 
foreign investor to choose a privatized firm.  
In Panel A of Table 5, we examine the host country characteristics and uncover some 
interesting binary relationships. For example, foreign participation is positively and significantly 
related to the institutional environment as proxied by LAW (at the 1% level). These results suggest 
that the extent of shareholder protection and law enforcement is an important determinant of 
foreign ownership. Foreign ownership is also highly associated with more social stability (lesser 
internal conflicts). The difference between with and without foreign participation sub-samples is 
significant at the 1% level. Turnover and the Gini coefficient are also significantly different 
between both sub-samples suggesting that foreign investors seek more developed and liquid 
markets and countries where social inequality is less important. As for the level of corruption, it is 
not significantly different between both sub-samples.    12
Panel B of Table 5 suggests that foreign investors prefer large firms, low-leveraged firms 
and large size issues. No significant differences are reported for efficiency or profitability. For 
their sample of newly privatized firms in the Czeck Republic, Anderson, Jandik and Makhija 
(2001) find that firms with foreign investors have larger assets, revenues and profitability than 
firms with no foreign investor.  
< Insert Table 5 around here > 
In Table 6, we report the results of a few more partitions based on the privatization 
process characteristics, such as the government residual ownership, the privatization method, 
the timing of privatization, industry affiliation, as well as imposed restrictions on foreign 
ownership, and draw the following conclusions: First, Panel A shows that control relinquishment 
by the government in the privatized firms is not associated with more foreign ownership. In other 
words, the level of foreign ownership is not related to the percentage of shares held by the 
government in the firm. In contrast, data on the privatization method shows that foreign 
ownership is higher when privatization is implemented through private sales (Panel B). The mean 
(median) foreign ownership stake is 30% (11%) for private sales compared to 11% (1%) for public 
offerings.  In Panel C, we contrast the ownership stake of foreign investors in late versus earlier 
privatizations, and show that the mean (median) stake is significantly higher in those firms that 
are privatized more recently (24%) (11%) compared to 14% (0%) for earlier privatizations. 
The industry distribution (Panel D) indicates that foreign investors, to some extent,  favor 
strategic sectors (i.e., energy, utilities, telecommunications, financials, transportations) over non-
strategic sectors (i.e., manufacturing), but the difference is only significant at the 10% level. 
Finally, we try to account for the restrictions on foreign ownership that prevail in certain 
countries by splitting our sample according to a RESTRICT variable that captures whether 
foreign ownership is restricted in a given country. The results (Panel E) suggest that there is no   13
significant difference across the partitions and that these restrictions might not be binding to 
foreigners. 
In summary, the newly privatized firms in our sample that involve foreign ownership have 
the following characteristics: their country of origin has a friendly institutional environment and 
the socio-economic conditions are relatively good. These firms are usually large in size and 
have been, on average, privatized through private sales. 
< Insert Table 6 around here > 
Multivariate Analysis 
In this section, we explore the determinants of foreign investors’ participation in 
privatizations. There is substantial evidence on the presence of selection bias in the privatization 
setting (Megginson and Netter, 2001). For instance, certain types of owners, particularly foreign 
investors, may be able to identify better-quality firms from institutionally friendlier countries. To 
correct for the potential selection bias in the privatization process, we employ the Heckman’s 
(1979) two-stage process summarized as follows: 
01 2 3 4 1 DFOR* INSTITUTION PRIVATIZATION CLV FLC+ α αα α α ε =+ + + +    (1) 
where DFOR* is a latent variable defined as DFOR=1 if DFOR*>0 (foreign investors participate in 
the privatization process) and DFOR=0 if DFOR*=0 (foreign investors do not participate in the 
privatization process); INSTITUTION includes a set of institutional variables defined in Table 3; 
PRIVATIZATION includes variables related to the privatization process characteristics; CLV and 
FLV refer to the country- and firm-specific control variables we discussed above, and ε1 is a 
normally distributed error term.  
In Equation (1) (first stage), we analyze the decision to invest by foreign investors, using a 
probit model that determines when the dependent variable in the second stage (equation 2) is   14
nonmissing (the dependent variable equals 1 if there is foreign participation in the privatized 
firm and 0 otherwise) . Equation (2) is defined as follows: 
01 2 3 2 FOR PRIVATIZATION FLC+ MILLS β ββ β ε =+ + +       ( 2 )  
where FOR is the extent of foreign ownership, MILLS is the inverse of Mills’ ratios derived from 
equation (1), and ε2 is a normally distributed error term. This equation, confined to observations 
where FOR is positive, allows us to investigate the determinants of the extent of foreign 
participation in the privatized firm.  We mainly include variables related to the privatization 
characteristics as well as firm-specific control variables.  
First-stage results. Table 7 presents the results of the estimation of foreign participation likelihood 
using Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure. We present four specifications of the model to be 
able to include alternatively significantly correlated variables (see Table 4). The high level of 
significance of the likelihood ratio (LR) test clearly justifies the use of the Heckman selection 
equation for our data. 
As shown in Table 7, the results are consistent with those reported in the univariate 
analysis and indicate that the institutional environment is an important determinant of the 
foreign investment decision. The coefficient estimates of the variables LAW and IC  are 
significant in their respective specifications (3 and 4). The higher are investor protection and law 
enforcement in a country, the higher is the likelihood that foreigners will invest in privatized firms. 
Likewise, privatized firms operating in countries with low internal conflicts are more likely to be 
recipients of foreign investment. The coefficient estimate of the LATE variable is positive and 
significant in one of the two specifications in which it is included. This result suggests that, in 
conformity with Perotti’s (1995) confidence building hypothesis, foreigners are more likely to 
invest in recently privatized firms.   In specification (2), the coefficient estimate of POLRISK is   
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that foreign investors seek countries with low political   15
uncertainty.  Furthermore, the proxy for social inequality (GINI) is always negatively and 
significantly related to the investment decision (three out of four specifications).  This result 
suggests that income inequality in the country deters foreign investors.  Corruption (COR), an 
other variable of interest, does not have a significant impact on foreign participation. In the first 
specification we also control for stock market development but its coefficient estimate is not 
significant. 
By all means, the adequacy of the institutional environment seems to be a critical 
determinant of the investment decision undertaken by foreigners. 3 
Table 7 also shows that the firm size seems to matter to a foreign investor in his decision to 
invest.  In particular, the firm size is consistently positively and significantly related to the 
likelihood that a foreign investor chooses to proceed with investment. This result is consistent 
with the evidence provided in both Kang and Stulz (1997) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) 
who find that foreign ownership is positively related to size. As sustained by Kang and Stulz 
(1997), size is a proxy for visibility and recognition to foreign investors.  
Finally, and In conformity with previous studies on the foreign direct investment decision, 
real GDP growth is an important factor in attracting foreign investment and is positively and 
significantly related to the investment decision in two out of four specifications. This result 
                                                 
3 We also consider the degree of human capital development (HDI) on the grounds that absorbing 
and adopting new technologies brought by foreign investors requires workers who have appropriate 
training and expertise. As a matter of fact, the presence of a well-educated pool of labor has 
become increasingly attractive for foreign investors (Noorbaksh, Paloni, and Youssouf 2001).   
However, the coefficient estimate of HDI, probably because this variable is strongly correlated with 
other explanatory variables, is never significant.    16
suggests that foreign investors show a preference for privatized firms operating in growing 
economies.4  
< Insert Table 7 around here > 
Second-stage results. Table 8 reports the results of the estimation of the second-stage equation. 
The Mills ratio is never significant, and is therefore not included. We note that the maximum 
ownership allowed to foreigners is never binding. Similarly, profitability is positively related to the 
extent of foreign ownership but its coefficient estimate is never significant.5 In contrast, our 
results suggest that the extent of foreign participation in privatized firms is higher in strategic 
sectors than in nonstrategic sectors (although the coefficient estimate of this dummy variable is 
significant only in one specification). Controlling for the privatization characteristics yields 
interesting results. First, in all four specifications, the method of privatization has a positive and 
significant impact on the share of foreign ownership (at the 1% level): foreign investors buy 
larger shares through private sales as opposed to public offerings. Furthermore, control 
relinquishment by the government has a negative impact on the stake bought by foreign 
investors, although it is never significant.  
To summarize, assuming that the decision to invest in a country conditions foreign 
ownership, we are able to conclude that, to foreign investors, confidence building by the 
government in addition to an adequate institutional environment and a growing economy are 
valuable incentives that make foreign investors more willing to participate in the privatization 
process.  
                                                 
4 Note that none of the  specifications include the variable LGDP which has no significant impact on 
the foreign direct investment decision. 
5 Likewise, the coefficient estimate of the variable leverage (which we do not report) is positive but 
never significant.   17
< Insert Table 8 around here> 
V. Conclusion  
Foreign direct investment in developing countries has recently received a renewed 
attention as a major determinant of financial development. Indeed, where markets are 
financially constrained, foreign investment offers a viable financing opportunity assorted with a 
transfer of technological and managerial know-how. This paper examines the determinants of 
foreign ownership in developing countries. To do so, we conduct an empirical analysis to 
determine what factors lead foreign investors into a specific market to invest in privatized firms 
and what determines the extent of ownership they hold in a particular privatized firm.  
Our first-stage estimation yields the following results: Consistent with our prediction, a 
friendly institutional environment, where minority investors’ rights are protected and laws are 
enforced, conditions foreign participation. Furthermore, social stability plays a significant role in 
explaining the investment decision. We also find that foreign investors are more likely to invest in 
privatized firms at the latest stages of the process in line with Perotti’s (1995) confidence building 
hypothesis. Finally, foreign investors are also more likely to participate in larger privatized firms 
and high growth economies.   
Our second-stage estimation shows that, in addition to the quality of the institutional 
environment, the extent of foreign ownership is larger in firms privatized through private sales.  
Our results overall highlight the need for governments to ensure a suitable and favorable 
institutional environment to attract and benefit from foreign investment. Our sample spans a 
large number of developing countries but future research could focus on transition economies, 
which we excluded from our analysis because of their particular institutional framework and 
their unique privatization experience (generally implemented through vouchers).    18
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Table 1 
Description of the Sample of Newly Privatized Firms in Developing Countries 
This table provides some descriptive statistics on the sample of 220 privatized firms from 28 developing 
countries.  We report the distribution of privatizations in the countries included in the sample by year, region, 
income, legal origin, and industry.  
Distribution of Privatizations 
By year    By region* 
Year    Number    Percentage    Region (countries)    Number    Percentage 
1980  1  0.46  North Africa and the Middle East (3)  66  30.00 
1981  1  0.46  East and South Asia and the Pacific (8)  43  19.55 
1985  4  1.83  Europe and Central Asia (1)  16  7.27 
1986  4  1.83  Latin America and the Caribbean (9)  64  29.09 
1987  3  1.38  Sub-Saharan Africa (7)  31  14.09 
1988 5 2.29  Total  (28)  220  100 
1989 12 5.50  By income* 
1990 12 5.50  Category  (countries)    Number    Percentage 
1991  25  11.47   Low-income Countries (15)  85  38.64 
1992 22 10.09  Lower-middle-income  Countries  (4)  65  29.55 
1993 11 5.05  Upper-middle-income  Countries  (9)  70  31.82 
1994 18 8.26  Total  (28)  220  100 
1995 20 9.17  By legal origin 
1996 37 16.06      Number  Percentage 
1997 29 13.30  Civil  law  (19)  170  77.27 
1998 11 5.05  Common  Law  (9)  50  22.73 
1999 4 1.83  Total  (28)  220  100 
2001 1 0.46  By industry 
     Agriculture  19  8.64 
     Energy  19  8.64 
     Financials  53  24.09 
     Industrials  29  13.18 
     Materials  32  14.55 
     Telecom  13  5.91 
     Transport  7  3.18 
     Utility  24  10.91 
     Others  24  10.91 
Total 220  100  Total  220 100 
* World Bank classification.   
Table 2 
Ownership Structure of Privatized Firms 
This table provides some descriptive statistics on the foreign and government ownership at the time of privatization (end 
of first year), for a sample of 220 privatized firms from 28 developing countries. The data comes mainly from privatization 
prospectuses, annual reports and other additional sources such as Asian, Brazil and Mexico Company Handbooks, 
Worldscope Disclosure and The Guide to Asian Companies. In Panel A, we use 200 privatized firms with complete data 
on foreign ownership stake. In Panel B, we use a sub-sample of 108 firms with strictly positive foreign ownership. All 
statistics are presented in percent. 
Ownership  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Quartile 1  Median  Quartile 3  Maximum 
Panel A. All Firms  (N=220)             
Foreign    19.17 29.67  0.00 0.00 1.71  25.00  100.00 
Government   36.75  31.91  0.00  1.00  35.22  65.00  95.00 
Panel B. Firms with Foreign Ownership (N=108)         
Foreign   35.50  32.44  0.28  9.65  23.45  56.05  100.00 
Government   40.30  30.38  0.00  7.50  39.55  64.62  95.00 
  
Table 3 
Summary of the Variables 
This table describes the variables used to investigate the determinants of foreign investors’ participation in the 
privatizations. 
Variable Definition  Source 
Panel A.  Institutional Variables   
LAW  Law and order: an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system (law component) and of 
popular observance of the law (order component) 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
COR  Corruption: an assessment of corruption within the political 
system 
As above 
IC  Internal conflicts: an assessment of political violence in the 
country (e.g., armed conflicts, arbitrary violence, civil war) 
and its actual or potential impact on governance 
As above 
POLRISK  Political Risk Index: an assessment of the country’s political 
stability 
As above 
GINI  Gini index: a measure of the dispersion of the income shares 
across the whole income distribution 
UNDR, World Income Inequality 
Database  
HDI  Human Development Index; an assessment of the state of 
human development (e.g., adult literacy, school enrollment, 
life expectancy, education) 
United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), various reports 
Panel B. Privatization Process Characteristics   
CONTROL  A dummy variable equals to unity if the privatization implies 
a relinquishment of control by the government and zero 
otherwise 
Company prospectus and 
annual reports 
METHOD  Privatization method: PS refers to a private sale and PSO 
refers to a public share offering 
World Bank Group’s 
Privatization Transaction 
Database 
LATE  A dummy variable equals to unity if the privatization occurs 
in a relatively late period (according to the country median 
date of all privatizations) and zero otherwise 
Authors’ calculation based on 
the World Bank Group’s 
Privatization Transaction 
Database 
Panel C. Country - and Firm -Specific Control Variables   
GDPG  Real GDP growth one year before privatization   World Development Indicators 
LGDP  Logarithm of GDP (constant 1995 $)  As above 
FORMAX  Maximum foreign ownership allowed in the country  IFC, Price Waterhouse 
TURNOVER  Stock market turnover: the total value of shares traded 
during the period divided by the average market 
capitalization for the period 
World Development Indicators  
ROS  Three-year pre-privatization average return on sales.  Company prospectus and 
annual reports 
SALEFF  Three-year pre-privatization average sales efficiency (real 
sales/number of employees) 
As above 
TDTA  Three-year pre-privatization average total debt to total 
assets 
As above  
SALES  Total sales as of the time of privatization (in $ 000)  As above 
LISSUE  The logarithm of the size of the privatization issue   Company prospectus and 
World Bank Group’s 
Privatization Transaction 
Database 
STRATEGIC  A dummy variable equal to unity if the firm belongs to a 
strategic industry (i.e., energy, utilities, telecommunications, 
financials, transportations) and zero otherwise 




Correlation Matrix: Country-Specific Institutional and Control Variables 
This table presents the correlation between the country-specific institutional and control variables. The 





POLRISK COR  IC  HDI  GINI  LAW TURNOVER  GDPG LGDP 
POLRISK  59.014  1.000                
  (9.542)                 
COR  2.888  0.778 1.000               
  (0.701)                 
IC  7.799  0.842 0.665  1.000             
  (2.113)                 
HDI  0.633  0.355 0.460  0.181  1.000           
  (0.112)                 
GINI  41.572  -0.130 0.078  -0.211  0.561 1.000         
  (9.640)                 
LAW  2.978  0.780 0.657  0.763  0.370  -0.240  1.000       
  (1.153)                 
TURNOVER  0.302  0.108 0.167  -0.117  0.523 0.369 0.330  1.000     
  (0.273)                 
GDPG  5.132  -0.201 -0.251  -0.058  -0.183 -0.007 -0.285  -0.022  1.000   
  (3.114)                 
LGDP  25.225  0.190 0.200  -0.001  0.569 0.439 0.282  0.606  -0.324  1.000 
  (0.946)                 
  
Table 5 
Country and Firm Characteristics  
This table compares country and firm characteristics for privatized firms without versus those with foreign 
ownership. Panel A includes country-specific characteristics and Panel B includes firm-specific characteristics. N 
refers to the number of observations. The last column reports the p-value of the test for difference in medians. 
The definitions of the variables are presented in Table 3. *, ** and *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 
1 percent level, respectively. 
    Firms with versus without Foreign Ownership 
   Without      With  
Test for 
Difference in 
  N Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median  Median 
Panel A. Institutional Characteristics 
POLRISK  96 57.854  62.151  106  62.500  63.000  0.145 
COR  98 2.857  3.000  117  2.966  3.000  0.228 
IC  98 7.816  8.000  117  8.598  9.000  0.004*** 
HDI  99 42.296  41.010  116  41.007  39.145  0.188 
GINI  77 1.764  1.600  69  1.741  1.600  0.087* 
LAW  98 3.541  3.000  117  3.821  4.000  <.0001*** 
TURNOVER  90 0.270  0.217  101  0.365  0.247  0.022** 
Panel B. Firm Characteristics 
ROS  97 0.089  0.061  117  0.107  0.070  0.608 
SALEFF  64 1.021  0.949  99  0.978  0.962  0.778 
TDTA  69 0.457  0.428  97  0.370  0.324  0.045** 
SALES  95 1466706  120190  115  1041515  190847  0.027** 




Privatization Characteristics  
This table compares foreign ownership stakes for the various sub-samples of privatized firms based on the 
characteristics of the privatization process. Panel A reports the results for control (firms privatized by more than 
50%) versus revenue privatizations (firms privatized by less than or equal to 50%). Panel B reports the results for 
privatizations through private sales (PS) versus those through public share offerings (PSO). Panel C presents the 
results for early versus late privatizations. Panel D compares strategic versus non-strategic industries. Panel E 
presents the results according to whether foreign ownership is restricted or not. Information on foreign 
ownership restrictions is mainly from Brennan and Cao (1997) and various issues of Emerging Stock Markets 
Factbook. N refers to the number of observations. The last column reports the p-value of the test for difference 
in medians. The definitions of the variables are presented in Table 3. *, ** and *** Significant at the 10 percent, 
5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 Total  Sample 
Test for Difference 
in 
 N  Mean  Median  Medians 
Panel A. Control versus Revenue        
Control  112 0.201  0.014 
Revenue  76 0.175  0.044 
0.763 
Panel B. Privatization Method        
PS  47 0.296  0.112 
POS  82 0.115  0.013 
0.001*** 
Panel C. Early versus Late privatization     
Early  105 0.144  0.000 
Late  95 0.244  0.112 
0.002*** 
Panel D. Strategic versus non-Strategic Industry     
Strategic  52 0.2574  0.1165 
Non- Strategic  148 0.1686  0.000 
0.089* 
Panel E. Foreign Restriction        
RESTRICT  94 0.207  0.007 
NO-RESTRICT  104 0.176  0.037 
0.753  
Table 7 
Determinants of Foreign Investor Participation in Privatizations: First-Stage Results 
This table presents the first stage estimates (using Heckman’s (1979) two step procedure) of the 
determinants of foreign investor participation in privatizations. Four specifications are reported: Each 
contains the coefficient estimates for the first stage model, which is a probit model that determines when 
the dependent variable in the second stage is nonmissing (the dependent variable equals 1 if there is 
foreign participation in the privatized firm and 0 otherwise). p-values are in parentheses below the 
estimated coefficients. LR reported at the bottom of the table is the likelihood-ratio test which compares the 
joint likelihood of and independent probit model for the first-stage model and a regression model on the 
observed foreign ownership data against the Heckman model likelihood. The definitions of the variables are 
presented in Table 3. *, ** and *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
IC       0.179** 
       (0.011) 
LAW     0.436***   
     (0.002)   
POLRISK   0.029*    
   (0.051)    
TURNOVER  0.646      
  (0.223)      
COR  0.134      
  (0.513)     
LATE  0.564**   0.311   
  (0.050)   (0.286)   
GINI  -0.051*** -0.030** -0.019  -0.024* 
  (0.000) (0.022)  (0.213)  (0.077) 
GDPG  0.061 0.058  0.109***  0.076** 
  (0.112) (0.124)  (0.008)  (0.050) 
LISSUE  0.181*** 0.182***  0.145** 0.196*** 
  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.033)  (0.002) 
INTERCEPT  0.185 -1.734  -2.000**  -1.798* 
 (0.831)  (0.107)  (0.035)  (0.069) 
        
LR 25.86***  23.21***  35.64***  27.91*** 
p  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Log likelihood  -79.21 -77.40  -74.85  -78.71 
N 












Determinants of Foreign Investor Participation in Privatizations: Second-Stage Results 
This table presents the second-stage estimates (using Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure) of the 
determinants of foreign investor participation in privatizations. The second-stage results of the four 
specifications in Table 7 are reported: The dependent variable is the stake of foreign ownership. p-values 
are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. The reported Wald test of all coefficients in the 
Heckman model being zero excludes the constant. The definitions of the variables are presented in Table 3. 
*, ** and *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
CONTROL  -0.053 -0.066  -0.064  -0.065 
  (0.446) (0.374)  (0.368)  (0.372) 
FORMAX  -0.022 0.037  0.003  0.036 
  (0.845) (0.751)  (0.978)  (0.743) 
STRATEGIC  0.130* 0.107  0.097  0.094 
  (0.093) (0.190)  (0.191)  (0.241) 
LATE  -0.141 -0.075  -0.113  -0.084 
  (0.115) (0.379)  (0.162)  (0.257) 
PS  0.451*** 0.412***  0.433***  0.391*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROS  0.038 0.072  0.051  0.039 
  (0.816) (0.679)  (0.761)  (0.818) 
LISSUE  -0.024 -0.019  -0.015  -0.010 
  (0.301) (0.458)  (0.483)  (0.653) 
INTERCEPT  0.507** 0.341  0.359*  0.248 
 (0.023)  (0.154)  (0.055)  (0.197) 
        
Wald chi2 46.50***  29.9***  33.03***  32.26*** 
Prob > chi2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
N  56 52  56  56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 